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Placebo scrutiny? Far-right extremism and intelligence accountability in 
Germany 
Abstract: The post-9/11 era has seen a proliferation of special, or one-off parliamentary inquiries into 
intelligence. This article examines the question of what quality such inquiries can achieve, exploring 
the scandal surrounding the case of the German far-right terrorist group National Socialist 
Underground (NSU). The article introduces a theoretical framework, with remit, rigor and reception as 
the key pillars of analysis. While special inquiries are often seen as a way of overcoming imperfections 
of the traditional accountability system, they can also create a placebo effect – an illusion of 
accountability which allows intelligence services to go uncontrolled under a blanket of democracy.   
 
Western practices of intelligence challenge existing structures of accountability.1 Public trust 
into institutions is considered a necessary precondition for democratic rule. Yet, intelligence 
techniques such as mass surveillance and extraordinary renditions continue to stir up debates 
about the scope and limits of current security policies, and intelligence conduct in particular. 
As a consequence, there has been a proliferation of scrutiny attempts with respect to 
intelligence conduct in democratic states.2 Parliamentary scrutiny of the security sector is 
now widely understood to be a necessary requirement of a democratic system, ideally 
achieving an acceptable trade-off between requirements of openness and the prioritization 
of secrecy within the intelligence realm. Yet, what level of quality do current accountability 
systems actually achieve?  
This article focuses on investigations concerning ‘one of the worst crime rampages in postwar 
German history’.3 Between 2000 and 2007, the far-right extremist cell National Socialist 
Underground (Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund, NSU) killed nine immigrants and a German 
police officer. The group of three also conducted a number of bombings with casualties as 
well as bank robberies across the country for more than a decade. Yet the extent of the NSU’s 
activities became evident only in November 2011. The fact that NSU members could stay 
undercover for about thirteen years and go about their lethal activities undetected by the 
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security authorities was described as a ‘disgrace’ by Chancellor Angela Merkel.4 The Federal 
Prosecutor even compared the NSU killings and their effect on German society to the impact 
that 9/11 had on the United States.5  
The questions of why intelligence and police services failed to establish the far-right 
motivation behind the murders; how they could not recognize the pattern linking the 
individual crimes; and why they did not disrupt the group’s activities, have been at the heart 
of several parliamentary inquiries. This article will draw on the four earliest inquiries to 
address the question of what constitutes a successful parliamentary inquiry into the realm of 
intelligence. It is unusual to have several investigative bodies examining a certain matter of 
national security, and the published evidence is unusually insightful. Additional materials, 
such as policy documents and media reports, were also consulted. Interviews were conducted 
with a number of individuals involved in either overseeing Germany’s intelligence services or 
in committee work of NSU inquiries, primarily at the federal level. They provided background 
material but also, in particular, useful reflections on the impact and meaning of their work. 
The aim is to expand the, so far, minuscule academic work on criteria for success in 
parliamentary special investigations. Wright persuasively claims: ‘(s)pecial inquiries into 
intelligence operations … are an emerging phenomenon. They have therefore not been the 
subject of much literature, and there are no universally agreed objectives or functions against 
which to evaluate them.’6 This article will put forward a set of criteria for assessing the quality 
of accountability work. Inquiries are costly and time-consuming, and an ineffective 
accountability system is therefore detrimental to the democratic process. There is, moreover, 
a risk that a proliferation of inquiries can act as placebo scrutiny, thus giving the impression 
of scrutiny while in reality preventing meaningful accountability.  
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The article is structured as follows: Building upon the existing literature on intelligence 
accountability, the first section outlines a framework for judging the quality of parliamentary 
investigations into intelligence. The second section provides the context of the German 
intelligence system and introduces the NSU case. Thereafter, the paper examines the 
performance of four inquiries into the NSU, at both the federal and state (Länder) level. Can 
the accountability efforts in this case be considered successful, or should they be understood 
as a form of placebo scrutiny? 
 
Assessing the work of special parliamentary inquiries into intelligence 
By now, ‘a focus on oversight and accountability has developed as a central element of 
academic Intelligence Studies’.7 Accountability is understood as an essential part of 
contemporary intelligence work in democracies – the intelligence services had to come ‘in 
from the cold’.8 Despite being normatively driven, the literature on intelligence accountability 
is under-theorized.9 Usually exploring empirical examples, a small strand studies topical 
aspects of accountability, including media-intelligence relations and challenges posed by 
private intelligence providers.10 By far the most substantial part of the literature focuses on 
country case studies, often with a focus on ordinary parliamentary work, thus oversight 
committees and plenary debates.11 The post-9/11 era calls for a deeper exploration of 
accountability measures, as controversial forms of intelligence gathering, including torture 
and mass surveillance, have been posing serious challenges to standing parliamentary 
oversight committees.12 As Aldrich and Richterova recently concluded: ‘European national 
accountability bodies…have performed poorly over the last decade.’13 It is therefore that the 
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work of special commissions is particularly interesting to study as they can be understood as 
one way of overcoming imperfections of standing intelligence accountability systems.  
A systematic account of the work of special commissions is still missing. So far, intelligence 
inquiries have been largely studied as individual cases, if at all.14 Aldrich’s article about four 
UK-based inquiries into Iraq and Gill’s work on inquiries with respect to security aspects of 
Northern Ireland’s “Troubles” demonstrate the advantages of being able to examine inquiries 
on an overall theme (if not the same topic) to ensure analytical consistency.15 Both authors 
analyze inquiries on a range of legal footings, however, including executive investigations and 
reporting through permanent oversight bodies. The best attempt at a comparative account 
of special commissions has been made by Farson and Phythian.16 Their edited volume draws 
insights on an international level and provides the broadest study of special commissions so 
far. Yet, their focus is rather on commissions of national security set up by the executive.  
The relative neglect of special inquiries in the existing literature is particularly surprising as 
intelligence-focused inquiries ‘have increased in number and geographical distribution in 
recent years’.17 Most Western parliaments can set up a special commission of inquiry to 
investigate intelligence work.18 Lustgarten and Leigh argue that such ad hoc inquiries are 
particularly relevant in two cases. Firstly, they are being initiated when scandals are 
particularly complex and require ‘an exceptional response outside a framework of scrutiny 
set up to shadow the work of particular agencies’.19 And secondly, they are understood to be 
an appropriate tool in cases where ‘the failure of the regular means of oversight may itself be 
part of what is to be investigated in any future cause célèbre’.20 In the context of the NSU 
terrorist activities, a mixture of both explanations can be established as will become evident 
below.  
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In order to make any claims about the quality of an inquiry’s performance, it is necessary to 
distinguish between oversight capacity – understood here to refer to means, expertise, and 
political willingness – and oversight effectiveness – which relates to rigor, efficiency, and 
impact.21 Any analytical framework needs to take both aspects into account. How can we 
generate criteria for assessment though? Farson and Phythian suggest to focus the analysis 
on ‘five separate stages of the inquiry process’: the circumstances regarding the creation of 
the commission; the process and politics of the investigation; how the inquiry arrived at its 
conclusion(s); the political consequences and impact; and the purpose of the commission.22 
Such features are helpful guidelines, yet those referring to the procedural aspects are too 
generic for a rigorous evaluation of the quality of parliamentary commissions’ work. In some 
respect, existing work on continuous parliamentary oversight provides a more detailed set of 
criteria. Comparing oversight committees in eight countries, Born et.al. find that useful 
criteria for the analysis include: the mandate of the oversight body; budget control powers; 
type/membership of oversight body; subpoena powers; and prior notification requests.23 
Overall, they identify five criteria for strong oversight: independence from the executive; 
powerful investigative capacity; access to classified information; the ability to maintain 
secrecy; and adequate support staff.24 These criteria are useful to establish the scope and 
investigatory powers of accountability holders, and they are applicable to one-off 
commissions as well.  
It appears, however, that the existing literature has focused upon questions of technocratic 
efficiency maximization. In an age of a crisis of confidence in democratic institutions, 
however, the performative characteristics of accountability played out in the public realm are 
also an urgent concern.25 How, and by whom, accountability results are perceived, welcomed 
or rejected, is significant when assessing the overall quality. Farson and Phythian rightly 
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include the dimension of consequences and impact in their guidelines.26 Special inquiries are 
uniquely positioned in this context as their work is more transparent by design (standing 
intelligence oversight committees normally meet in private, do not often directly report to 
the public, and their members are normally sworn to secrecy). Beyond their formal purpose 
of ensuring the effectiveness of intelligence, the additional desired effect of one-off inquiries 
is a performative one. They can publicly proclaim what is, and what is not acceptable. Though 
the reception is, to some extent, out of the hands of the accountability holders, their impact 
and relevance is obviously higher in a situation in which their findings and policy 
recommendations are being taken on board than when their work is being rejected or barely 
discussed. This way, public trust is more likely to be maintained or restored. 
Based on the discussion above, this paper proposes a framework for analyzing special 
parliamentary committees on intelligence, comprising the following three core criteria: remit; 
rigor; and reception.  
 
Remit Rigor Reception 
Mandate Investigative capacity Output 
Expertise Access Perception 
Independence Political will Implementation 
 
Table 1: Three criteria for assessing the work of special intelligence commissions 
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Firstly, the remit of an investigation relates to the direction, feasibility, and depth of the 
committee’s work. How broad, or narrow, is the remit? Has the inquiry asked the right 
questions? Do committee members have the knowledge or experience to investigate the 
matter? Secondly, the quality of an investigation is determined by the rigor of the committee 
and its work methods. Does the committee have sufficient means and investigatory powers 
to examine the issue in question? Are the members sufficiently rigorous in their work, and 
why (not)? Is there sufficient (political/individual) willingness to explore the matter? To what 
extent does the executive, or subject in question, cooperate with, or resist the committee? 
And thirdly, the criteria of reception refers to the question of which audiences were addressed 
by the committee. If addressing executive authorities, what determines a committee’s ability 
to have its recommendations implemented? If addressing the wider public, or certain groups 
of victims, how is the committee’s work perceived by those groups once concluded? 
Table 1 shows the factors determining success or failure of special parliamentary inquiries. 
The precise admixture of remit, rigor and reception will determine the result. How the 
constellation varied among the inquiries concerned with the NSU scandal will be explored in 
the reminder of the article, after a brief introduction of the specific context.  
 
The NSU under the radar of Germany’s security authorities 
The German intelligence system is split between the federal and the state level. At the federal 
level, there are three intelligence agencies - the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV) is Germany’s domestic security agency; 
the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) is responsible for foreign 
intelligence; and the Military Counter-Intelligence Service (Militärischer Abschirmdienst, 
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MAD) constitutes a part of the Federal Armed Forces. While the BND and the MAD have no 
equivalents at the state level, the BfV has offshoots in each state. Eight states each have a 
State Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz, LfV) 
whereas the other eight states maintain a relevant unit within their respective Ministry of the 
Interior.27 The state offices are independent institutions; the BfV is not authorized to instruct 
them.  
Legislative oversight of the federal intelligence services is primarily conducted through the 
Parliamentary Control Panel (Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremium, PKGr) of the German 
Bundestag.28 A preliminary form of this parliamentary committee was established in 1956, 
though it was only put on a legal footing in 1978.29 In the current legislative period, the PKGr 
comprises of nine members, representing all political factions of the Bundestag and elected 
by majority vote. The PKGr’s mandate calls not only for scrutinizing the performance of the 
intelligence services, but also that of the federal government with regard to its governing and 
use of the intelligence services. Further parliamentary oversight is conducted through the 
independent G 10 Commission (G-10 Kommission). It examines the interference of 
intelligence agencies with the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications, a 
right outlined in Article 10 of the German Basic Law. In addition, the Bundestag’s Trust 
Commission (Vertrauensgremium) is responsible for the budget of the intelligence services. 
The LfVs are scrutinized by committees of the respective state parliaments, such as the 
Parliamentary Control Committee (Parlamentarische Kontrollkommission, PKK) in Saxony. The 
precise oversight arrangements vary. 
The revelations of 4th November, 2011 shook the system as a whole when the wider public 
learnt about the existence of the NSU for the first time. On that day, the two male members 
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of the group - Uwe Böhnhart and Uwe Mundlos - were found dead in a trailer. The police 
found a Ceska 83 at the scene, and the pistol was quickly identified as the murder weapon in 
a number of, until then, unsolved cases. Enver Simsek, who owned a flower shop in 
Nuremberg, Bavaria, was the first victim of what became known as the NSU’s Ceska series. 
Böhnhardt and Mundlos shot him in his shop on 9 September, 2000. Within the next seven 
years, the NSU killed nine businessmen with a migration background; and one police officer. 
Inquiries into the NSU killing series have established that, at least in most cases, the group 
chose their victims deliberately and prepared each murder carefully, using an address 
databank, city maps, and similar material.30 Evidence found in the trailer as well as in the flat 
of Beate Zschäpe, the third member of the NSU, revealed a xenophobic and far-right 
background. ‘This is our 11th of September’.31 The dramatic words of former MP Wolfgang 
Wieland suggest the shock many people felt when learning about the NSU’s actions. Over a 
period of thirteen years, the NSU managed to stay undercover and commit numerous crimes. 
How was this possible? 
Far-right extremism has been a long-standing concern in Germany, especially due to its 
history of the Third Reich. Yet German authorities continue to struggle with the phenomenon. 
As Jaschke maintains, in the post-war period, ‘German politics denied the existence of a 
xenophobic far-right movement for many years in order to be accepted by the international 
community.’32 Yet, most recent numbers by the BfV suggest that, today, about 23,000 
individuals in Germany are connected with the far-right scene.33 These individuals do ‘not 
believe in a pluralist society, democracy, and individual human rights’.34 The creation of the 
Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) party in April 2013 and its remarkable 
success in a number of elections over the last few years has caused new concerns about the 
‘normalization’ of right-wing attitudes in German society. While some members of the 
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Eurosceptic and xenophobic party are outspoken far-right extremists, the party is currently 
not categorized as ‘extremist’ (and therefore is not monitored) by the BfV.35  
The responsibility to tackle the ‘complex internal security issue’36 of far-right extremism is 
split among the domestic security services – the BfV and its state counterparts – and the 
police. The BfV has engaged with right-wing extremism since its creation in 1950.37 The BND 
and the MAD are sometimes involved, too. Yet, since the NSU’s activities became publicly 
known, several observers have criticized the fact that the security services have failed to pay 
sufficient attention to far-right extremism and violence over the last decades.38 A 2004 special 
report by the BfV strikingly concluded: ‘Right now, there are no recognizable far-right terrorist 
organizations or structures’ in Germany.39 And in 2012, Jörg Ziercke, then Director of the 
Federal Crime Agency (BKA) admitted that, at the beginning of the 1990s, when various 
vicious attacks against shelters for refugees and asylum-seekers were conducted across 
Germany, much more could have been done to concisely fight violent far-right extremism.40 
So, the question of the extent to which security institutions possibly ignored, or failed to 
sense, right-wing activities became one of the core issues of investigations. 
 
The mosaïc of NSU investigations 
The extent of the NSU’s crimes, and the public outcry about the fact that the group had been 
undisturbed by security authorities for such a long time, led to an unprecedented number of 
parliamentary investigations (see Tables 2 and 3). One can distinguish the twelve distinct 
inquiries by two waves. The first set of inquiries were created in the immediate aftermath of 
the first revelations about the NSU in November 2011. While the Bundestag inquiry focused 
on a holistic, Germany-wide approach to the issue, the other three inquiries were initiated in 
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those states with arguably the strongest links to the NSU scandal: Thuringia – where the NSU 
members were embedded and radicalized in far-right movements; Saxony – where the trio 
lived undercover for over a decade; and Bavaria – where five of the ten murders took place. 
The second, partly ongoing wave includes investigations which have been set up since 2014 
in order to answer open questions, or to follow up on issues arising from the first set of 
inquiries or newly revealed material. 
State/Federal Initation date Publication of final 
report 
Landtag Thuringia, First Commission of Inquiry 
of the 5th Legislative Period (‘Right-wing 
terrorism and agency performance’) [Thuringia 
UA] 
26/1/2012 
 
16/7/2014 
Deutscher Bundestag, Second Commission of 
Inquiry of the 17th Legislative Period (‘Terror 
group National Socialist Underground’) 
[Bundestag UA] 
27/1/ 2012 22/8/2013 
Landtag Saxony, Third Commission of Inquiry of 
the 5th Legislative Period (‘Networks of 
neonazis in Saxony‘) [Saxony UA] 
17/4/2012 27/6/2014 
Landtag Bavaria, Commission of Inquiry (’Far-
right terrorismus in Bavaria - NSU 2012-2013’) 
[Bavaria UA] 
4/7/2012 10/7/2013 
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Table 2: First wave of parliamentary inquiries into NSU-related issues 
 
 
State/Federal Initation date Publication of final 
report 
Landtag Hesse, Second Commission of Inquiry of 
the 19th Legislative Period (‘NSU’) 
22/5/2014  Report pending 
Landtag North-Rhine Westphalia, Third Special 
Commission of Inquiry of the 16th Legislative 
Period (‘NSU-Terror  in  North Rhine-Westphalia),  
4/11/2014 31/3/2017 
Landtag Baden-Wurtemberg, First Commission 
of Inquiry of the 15th Legislative Period (‘Far-
right terrorism / NSU Baden-Wurtemberg’) 
5/11/2014 15/1/2016 
Landtag Thuringia, First Commission of Inquiry of 
the 6th Legislative Period (‘Right-wing terrorism 
and agency performance II’) 
27/2/2015 Ongoing 
investigation 
Landtag Saxony, First Commission of Inquiry of  
the 6th Legislative Period (‘Networks of neonazis 
in Saxony II’)  
27/4/2015 Ongoing 
investigation 
German Bundestag, Third Commission of Inquiry 
of the 18th Legislative Period (‘Terror group 
National Socialist Underground’ II) 
11/11/2015  23/6/2017 
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Landtag Brandenburg, First Commission of 
Inquiry of the 6th Legislative Period (‘Organised 
far-right violence and agency performance, 
especially concerning the National Socialist 
Underground‘) 
29/4/2016 Ongoing 
investigation 
Landtag Baden-Wurtemberg, First Commission 
of Inquiry of the 16th Legislative Period (‘The 
NSU’s support network and investigations into 
the attack on police officers M. K. and M. A. (‘Far-
right extremism / NSU Baden-Wurtemberg II‘) 
20/7/2016 Ongoing 
investigation 
 
Table 3: Second wave of parliamentary inquiries into NSU-related issues 
 
While these investigations, ultimately, all ask the question of why the NSU’s activities had not 
been interrupted earlier, their precise mandates vary. To keep the analysis coherent, and the 
material manageable for a paper of this length, the remaining article will focus on the initial 
NSU inquiries, hence those of the first wave. It will assess the investigations by drawing on 
remit, rigor and reception as the three pillars of the framework established above.   
 
Remit 
Special inquiries into intelligence have a complex task at their hand. Wright suggests that ad 
hoc inquiries in this subject area  
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generally seek to: establish what happened, learn lessons and prescribe ameliorative action 
to prevent recurrence, provide a forum for the expression and relief of suffering and anger, 
hold individuals and institutions accountable (though not make findings of civil or criminal 
liability) and provide public reassurance and restore public confidence.41 
As will become evident below, all inquiries under review in this article tried indeed to address 
all of those issues, though they gave varied weight to the different strands of inquiry.  
 
Mandate 
At the federal level, all parties represented in the Bundestag agreed on the necessity to 
investigate the NSU scandal once first details became known in late 2011. While some would 
have preferred to leave the investigation to the standing PKGr, supported by a special 
investigator, others suggested the creation of a governmental expert commission, staffed by 
federal and state officials, to identify weaknesses in the existing security infrastructure. As a 
compromise, the Bundestag plenum agreed in mid-January 2012 to set up the executive 
Bund-Länder-Kommission Far-Right Extremism (Bund-Länder-Kommission Rechtsterrorismus) 
alongside a special parliamentary inquiry commission titled Terror Group National Socialist 
Underground (2. Untersuchungssausschuss: Terrorgruppe nationalsozialistischer Untergrund; 
hereafter called Bundestag UA).42 The parliamentary commission commenced its work on 27 
January, 2012 and released its report on 22 August, 2013. Its mandate was extensive. In 
addition to gathering a thorough understanding of the NSU and its environment, the 
commission was tasked to investigate questions, such as the following: What did German 
security authorities know about the ten murders? Did their erratic performance allow the 
NSU to continue their activities for such a long period of time? What was the role of paid 
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informants (V-Personen) working for police and intelligence? And what reforms would be 
necessary to improve Germany’s fight against right-wing extremism?43 The commission was 
to establish recommendations for improvement, especially with regard to a more effective 
tackling of far-right extremism. 
In Thuringia, permanent parliamentary committees realized quickly that their investigations 
into the NSU-related events were undermined by a lack of cooperation by the authorities.44 
To enable a proper parliamentary review, the decision was made on 18 January 2012 to set 
up a one-off inquiry. An interim report was published in March 2013, followed by a final one 
on 16 July 2014.45 The focus of the investigation was on three issues: mistakes by security and 
judicial authorities during the investigations; the development of far-right extremism in 
Thuringia; and the influence of security authorities on the neonazi scene.46 While similarly 
broad in terms of themes when compared to the Bundestag UA, Thuringia’s UA was naturally 
more restricted in terms of geography, exclusively focusing on events and institutions in its 
state.  
Similarly, the inquiries in Saxony – with a strong focus on potential wrongdoing by the 
executive – and Bavaria – with the aim of exploring executive performance with regard to 
right-wing extremism more broadly and the investigations of the NSU’s five murders in 
Bavaria in particular – focused on their respective state.47 All state-based inquiries were to 
make recommendations for improvement and changes, like the Bundestag’s one. Despite 
focusing on a lengthy period of time – 1994, when first links between the NSU and Bavarian 
neonazi groups became apparent, and July 2012, the month in which the inquiry was 
established, the Bavarian investigation was the shortest and most limited. The final report is 
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comparatively short, too. In contrast, the mandate of the Saxony UA was vast, comprising 
eight broad themes - of which three were not investigated at all in the end.48  
It is noteworthy that some state governments tried to avoid a parliamentary inquiry exploring 
links between the NSU and their state. In Hesse, for example, where Halit Yozgat was 
murdered by the NSU on 6 April 2006, the creation of a parliamentary inquiry was first 
delayed, and has subsequently been undermined by party rivalries to such an extent that the 
draft final report does not offer any joint conclusions or recommendations.49  
 
Composition and expertise 
The inquiries’ task was huge. They were given broad mandates. The public interest was 
enormous. And they had to examine two very secretive environments: the world of 
intelligence and police as well as the realm of far-right groupings. This raises the question of 
agency, or membership.50 Yet what constitutes a ‘good’ scrutineer examining matters of 
intelligence is a question seldom asked. In order to explore intelligence issues efficiently and 
effectively, not only is political will required (see below), but it is arguably also helpful to have, 
at least a few members of the committee with a thorough understanding of the complex 
institutional set-up of national security structures, their legal framework and some knowledge 
of the secret world of agents and informers. The Bundestag’s committee was composed of 
eleven members of parliament; all parties were represented. Two members of the committee 
– Clemens Binninger and Armin Schuster (who joined the committee only on 16 January 2013) 
– have a professional background in policing; seven other members have a legal background. 
Binninger also had extensive experience in investigating issues of intelligence. Together with 
Hartfrid Wolff, he was one of two committee members who was also serving on the standing 
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PKGr during the period of the special NSU inquiry. The majority of committee members had 
a long-standing interest in issues of internal security, and a few – such as Sebastian Edathy, 
Petra Pau and Sönke Rix – were previously concerned with far-right extremism.  
While the Bundestag’s committee brought together individuals with a sound mix of expertise 
and evident interest in the subject matters of intelligence, internal security and right-wing 
extremism, the composition of the NSU committees in Saxony, Thuringia and Bavaria was 
more diverse. The state committees also varied considerably in size: the biggest one was the 
Saxony UA with nineteen parliamentarians, and the smallest was the Bavaria UA, comprising 
only nine members.  
To fill certain gaps of knowledge, and to gather a more independent picture, special 
commissions can ask for expert testimonies. Both the Bundestag UA and Thuringia’s UA 
sought advice from a range of experts on issues including violent extremism, security 
architecture and culture and civil society efforts at victims’ support.51 Saxony’s UA limited the 
number of consulted experts to six; and Bavaria’s UA questioned only three.52 Journalist 
Andrea Röpke acted as an expert witness in all inquiries.  
One of the key tasks of all inquiries was to shed light on the performance of the security sector 
with respect to far-right extremism. Why had the NSU been able to work under the radar of 
security authorities for so long? Was it due to individual incompetence, or were there rather 
systemic flaws which could be identified? The way in which the investigations tackled the 
question reveals important aspects of how seriously the members took their mandate.  
 
Performance of security authorities 
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Thuringia’s intelligence and police performance was naturally a focus of the investigations, as 
it was the NSU’s home state. The UAs of the Bundestag and Thuringia collected impressive 
evidence to show that, in the 1990s, the Thuringian authorities – still in the process of setting 
up their security and judicial apparatus from scratch after the German Democratic Republic 
ceased to exist – struggled considerably to tackle the vivid local right-wing scene. Bigger 
groups, such as the Thuringia Homeland Security (Thüringer Heimatschutz, THS), founded in 
1996, had about 160 members at their peak.53 There was both a lack of strategy and 
experience with respect to the tackling of right-wing extremism.  
The collected evidence shows that the activities of the NSU could have been stopped at an 
early stage. On 26 January 1998, the police raided the properties of the three NSU members 
and found a bomb workstation in Zschäpe’s garage. Yet to issue the warrants for the three 
individuals took such a long time, that they could escape and go undercover.54 Moreover, in 
the garage, local police officers and two officials of the BKA subsequently found a list of the 
‘who is who’ of Germany’s right-wing scene, including postal addresses and telephone 
numbers. This was described as not relevant to the investigations and put aside. Thuringia’s 
inquiry found that the list could have led the authorities to some of the trio’s closest 
supporters.55 But not only did the Thuringian authorities fail to stop the NSU activities at an 
early stage. The Bundestag UA found, for instance, that other security authorities had some 
useful information about the trio but did not share the information with their colleagues in 
Thuringia.56 
The two UAs provided staggering material concerning Helmut Roewer, then Director of 
Thuringia’s TLfV. He personally created a front company called the Heron Publisher (Heron-
Verlag) in October 1997, using the name of ‘Stephan Seeberg, journalist’.  Yet, the publishing 
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house’s connection with the TLfV well known before the release of the first publication. It was 
therefore no longer of use to the intelligence agency.57 It still continued to exist, however, 
and published a number of books, with some of its authors being easily linked to the TLfV. 
The purpose of the creation remains somewhat unclear. 
The shortcomings and failure of the security authorities in Thuringia amounted to what can 
only be called a systemic failure. It appears that ministerial supervision had been rather lax in 
this state. Witness Bernd Hillmann, who was involved in the managerial supervision of the 
TLfV within Thuringia’s Ministry of Interior, maintained that the TLfV was working 
autonomously and was kept on a ‘relatively long leash’, i.e. there was an exchange between 
the ministry and the TLfV once a month only.58 A 2000 report looking into the status quo of 
the TLfV, produced by lawyer Karl-Heinz Gasser [Gasser Report] as a reaction to media 
allegations about chaos and mismanagement, suggested that supervision and oversight were 
basically non-existent for years.59 Echoing the Gasser Report, Thuringia’s Report draws the 
conclusion that the supervisory authorities in the Ministry of the Interior were little or not at 
all interested in exercising their control and guidance functions concerning the TLfV’s 
performance and strategic direction.60 
Another factor considered by the inquiries was the degree of cooperation among security 
institutions. According to the Thuringia report, and based on the evidence of a number of 
witnesses, regular and intensive information exchange took place among police units, 
including the State Security units of the Criminal Police Departments and the TLKA. But there 
was also a lot of rivalry, especially between intelligence and police services – namely the TLKA 
and the TLfV, which negatively affected cooperation. A number of witnesses of the State 
Security units of Jena and Saalfeld as well as the TLKA argued that the TLfV was trying to 
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gather all information in a one-way fashion, i. e. the TLfV gathered information from the police 
and prosecution offices without delivering anything themselves. The TLfV’s defence was 
allegedly on the basis of the protection of sources. However, the erratic information flow from 
the TLfV to the police led to several instances in which the police was surprised by events in 
the right-wing extremist scene and could not react swiftly or powerful enough.61 For example, 
in November 1999 the TLfV did not inform the police about a skinhead concert in Schorba, 
close to Jena. When the police arrived, they were unable to stop the thousand or so neonazis 
from destroying the pub where they had gathered.62  
While the Thuringian commission provided a rich analysis of the intelligence realm, the 
Bavarian UA produced a much weaker report. A lot of it is simply a summary of what individual 
witnesses said, rather than a critical examination of the gathered material. One example 
concerns a 2011 statement by the Bavarian LfV which suggested that the Verfasssungsschutz 
had not been aware of a connection between the THS, the NSU and Bavarian neo-Nazis. This 
statement was sharply criticized by journalist Röpke, one of the expert witnesses. She 
suggested that either the LfV did not do their job properly or they were simply lying.63 More 
generally, by comparison to the incomplete picture of the far-right scene drawn by Bavarian 
intelligence officials, the Bavarian UA was reportedly astonished about the detailed and 
informed picture the three invited academic experts were able to provide.64 
The conclusion in Thuringia’s report could not have been clearer. The search for the NSU trio 
between 1998 and 2003 is described as a ‘disaster.’65 The failure to stop the NSU was neither 
down to bad luck or individual mistakes nor to organizational shortcomings (although there 
were plenty of them).66 They found that the growing willingness to use violence within the 
militant wing of the far-right was ‘massively underestimated’ by the authorities.67 In contrast 
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to the report of Thuringia’s UA, the commissions in Saxony and Bavaria provided a rosier 
picture. The Bavarian Commission found shortcomings concerning the performance of the 
domestic intelligence services, the police and the judicial authorities. It also found deficits 
with respect to cooperation, but it did not conclude that there was a general collapse, or 
failure, of the system. Similarly, the factions of the then government parties in the Saxonian 
report concluded that members of state institutions were not to blame for the flawed 
investigations of the NSU trio as such a series of crimes had, so far, been ‘unimaginable.’68  
Overall, the findings about the performance of security authorities suggest that the inquiry 
member of the Bundestag and in Thuringia gained a deeper and clearer understanding of the 
situation than the other two inquiry teams. They asked more probing questions and appeared 
to be better able to identify important connections between individual testimonies as well as 
between testimonies and related evidence. To what extent this also comes down to 
independence and political will, will be discussed in the following. 
 
Independence 
All four inquiries had a challenging task of exploring a complex socio-political issue, tracing 
the performance of security authorities for a lengthy period of time. There is no reason to 
suggest that the committees were not sufficiently independent from the officials and 
institutions subjected to their scrutiny in order to perform well. Set up as special 
parliamentary inquiries, the distance between the investigated executive institutions and the 
committee members was appropriate. Nevertheless, the discussion of rigour below, and 
political will in particular, suggests that the UAs of Bavaria and Saxony were the weakest 
investigatory bodies, also providing softer criticism of the executive than those in the 
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Bundestag and Thuringia. Especially concerning Saxony, this is certainly not due to the fact 
that there were no grounds for critique concerning the executive authorities. Opposition 
members rather suggested that the commission’s composition affected the work. Eleven out 
of the 19 members of the UA came from the governmental coalition parties. This group 
allegedly considered the work of the UA to be unnecessary from the beginning and refused 
to put severe blame on their ‘own’ government.69 Moreover, as all parties are to be included 
in a special commission, the far-right National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationale 
Demokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD) also had a seat in the Saxony UA. This factor 
impeded collaboration with parliamentary counterparts elsewhere. Crucially, the Chairman 
of the Bundestag UA rejected any collaboration with its Saxonian counterparts due to the 
NDP’s involvement. 
 
Rigour 
At the core of assessing the quality of a parliamentary commission’s work scrutinising 
intelligence-related activities is the question of thoroughness and rigidity.  
 
Investigative capacity 
As special inquiries, the UAs had greater investigatory powers than the corresponding 
standing intelligence committees. Special inquiries focus solely on the topic outlined in their 
mandate; and they are, at least in principle, not restricted by time and resources in a way the 
permanent bodies are. The Special Commission Law (PUAG) gives the Bundestag UA the right 
to employ a special investigator and to refer issues to the relevant courts.70 The special 
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inquiries’ right of accessing documents and witnesses is also clearly regulated. In contrast to 
standing intelligence committees, the meetings of special inquiries at federal and state level 
are held in public, unless there are substantial reasons for a closed session. Their written 
reports are presented to parliament and subsequently publicly available. 
Over a period of nineteen months, the Bundestag UA held seventy sessions and interviewed 
ninety-five witnesses and sixteen experts. The Bundestag made use of its right to involve a 
special investigator to facilitate and accelerate the access to material.71 In Thuringia, the UA 
met sixty-eight times between February 2012 and July 2014 and consulted an extensive list 
of experts and witnesses. In contrast, the Bavaria UA held only thirty-one meetings, 
questioned fifty-five witnesses and invited three experts.72 The commission in Saxony 
gathered thirty-six times over a period of twenty-six months and questioned thirty-four 
witnesses. Eighty-three further witnesses had been identified but were not interviewed in the 
end for ‘a number of reasons’.73  
 
Access 
All committees had to face serious obstacles to inquiry. The one singular challenge for 
investigators exploring events related to the security and, in particular, intelligence realm lies 
in the access to information. They rely to a considerable extent on official documents and 
communication records when attempting to trace activities and decision-making. One major 
hurdle for a detailed investigation of crucial aspects of authorities’ conduct in the context of 
the NSU case was the destruction, or loss, of a considerable number of documents of security 
authorities. Right at the beginning of its inquiry, the Bundestag UA found that the BfV had 
shredded documents related to the surveillance of Thuringia’s far-right scene. The 
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destruction took place on the 11th of November, 2011. The Bundestag UA investigated this 
aspect in depth as it was aware that those kind of actions would have a negative impact on 
public trust and feed conspiracy theories. The documents related to “Mission Rennsteig” 
(Operation Rennsteig), an information-gathering campaign run by the BfV between 1997 and 
2003 and targeting Thuringia’s neonazi scene.74 The campaign included the recruitment of 
informers (V-Personen). While a senior BfV official appears to have independently initiated 
the documents’ destruction, the Bundestag UA did not come to a satisfying explanation about 
“Mission Konfetti”, as the destruction of the documents was ironically dubbed.75 The Federal 
Ministry of the Interior (BMI) found a way to reconstruct most of the documents.  
The Bundestag UA sharply criticized the destruction of documents. Heinz Fromm, then 
Director of the BfV, had to appear before the UA – and due to his performance stepped down 
from his post shortly thereafter. Yet, the UA came across other incidences of document loss. 
The BMI admitted that it requested on 14 November 2011 the destruction of a set of 
documents concerning the electronic surveillance of members of the far-right scene. It argued 
that the destruction was done on a routine basis, referring to data protection rules. Not only 
is the timing suspicious though, but Germany’s Federal Data Protection Supervisor, Peter 
Schaar, also emphasized that the law did not require a destruction of files, simply a freeze.76 
“Mission Konfetti” was not the only incident of document loss. Several state institutions 
struggled with the provision of documentary access at some point during the investigations. 
In Saxony, then Director of the SLfV Reinhard Boos, had to step down from his post in July 
2012 when a file containing phone surveillance protocols of 1998 with relevance to the NSU 
case suddenly re-appeared in his agency after it had been declared lost previously. 
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A further challenge for all inquiries was the fact that some witnesses of the executive suffered 
from remarkably poor memory. This became dramatically apparent during the efforts of the 
Thuringia UA to examine the work of the Special Commission on Right-wing Extremism (Soko 
REX) of Saxony’s LKA in the 1990s. While a single former member of the Soko, KHM Mario 
Melzer, stood out, providing a detailed account of many aspects and events and being 
apparently critical and reflective of failures and shortcomings, most other witnesses could 
barely remember anything about their work in, or with the Soko. This includes a 37-year old 
female official who had been a team member of the Soko but found herself unable to even 
describe her work responsibilities at the time. Similarly, the then head of the Police Unit in 
the Ministry of the Interior, Michael Eggers, failed to make a detailed statement about the 
performance of the Soko REX.77  
It is troubling that a few senior officials even appear to have misled parliamentarians. A 
striking example concerns the statement before Thuringia’s UA by Peter Nocken, then deputy 
head of the TLfV. He insisted that state authorities were ‘blind’ for some time concerning the 
activities of neonazi groups in Thuriginia as the only reliable V-Person then was Tino Brandt, 
alias Otto.78 Not only was Brand the head of the THS though, but thanks to the work of the 
special commissions it is now known that, over time, there were up to 45 V-Personen from 
the group working for the security authorities.79 
 
Political will 
In the section on investigative capacity above, it has already been indicated that the four 
special inquiries were composed and will-powered differently. Whereas the Bundestag and 
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the Thuringia UAs were based on a broad political consensus to shed light on the NSU and 
authorities’ performance, the UAs in Saxony and Bavaria spoke much less with one voice. 
The degree of political will is, to a considerable extent, mirrored in the way the investigations 
were conducted. Arguably the hardest test for political will are issue areas which are 
particularly controversial and where the commissions are likely to face resistance.  The 
following section will focus on two of those issues: racism and the role of V-Personen. 
 
Trivialisation of far-right extremism or institutional racism? 
Each of the four investigations clearly revealed that state authorities underestimated the 
extent of activities of far-right, xenophobic groups in Germany and their willingness to use 
violence. In other words, right-wing extremism was trivialized.80 Especially puzzling is the 
question of why the police units working on the separate NSU murder cases so quickly 
dismissed a xenophobic motif. While, for example, Bavaria’s Minister of the Interior, Günther 
Beckstein, raised the question of a xenophobic motif immediately after the first NSU murder 
of florist Enver Simsek, the police investigators favored the hypothesis that Simsek was the 
victim of an unknown criminal organization which they thought acted from some kind of 
migrant milieu.81 In the following, the investigators of the other killings in the series followed 
similar investigative lines, respectively targeting a ‘flower mafia’, a ‘kebab mafia’, a human 
trafficking organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or the Turkish Hezbollah.82 A 
right-wing motif was still dismissed even when community members turned to street protests 
after the killings in the cities of Kassel and Dortmund in April 2007. Their attempt to point 
towards a potential right-wing motif was barely picked up by the police or the media.83 
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So where did this ignorance towards an extremist motif stem from? The inquiries of the 
Bundestag and Thuringia provided ample of evidence to demonstrate how Helmut Roewer, 
as President of the TLfV a central figure in the case, was clearly racially motivated. In January 
1999, he maintained at a public event that one should attempt to ‘understand’ youngsters 
with right-wing leanings, as the Third Reich had no negative sides. The Thuringia report 
describes this event as ‘shocking’ and points out that such a misrepresentation of history 
cannot be brought in accordance with the values outlined in the Land’s constitution.84 Roewer 
also discredited anti-nazi work by political institutions on a few occasions.85 According to one 
of the experts involved in the inquiry, Peter Reif-Spirek, Roewer’s approach reflects the 
general attitude among the Thuringian political establishment in the 1990s which tended to 
play down right-wing extremism and failed to consider non-violent forms of xenophobia as a 
problem.86  
A related strand of investigations for all committees was the question to what extent security 
authorities were racially biased and possibly tolerated far-right activities. Again, the findings 
were particularly striking in the case of Thuringia. The parliamentarians found that right-wing 
violence among teenagers, for example, had been ‘de-politicized and trivialized’ by security 
and judicial authorities.87 One example concerns the THS - a militant neonazi movement 
which was the breeding ground for the NSU. Before Thuringia’s UA, the THS was described by 
experts and the police as a well organized, big, robust neonazi grouping. Yet in sharp contrast 
to those statements, Peter Nocken, deputy director of Thuringia’s LfV, suggested that the THS 
was a loose conglomerate without members, membership cards or membership fees. Expert 
Matthias Quent emphasized that the LfV did not pick up the clandestine terrorist activities in 
the wider circles of the THS. Generally, Nocken left the impression to be poorly informed. For 
example, he estimated that the comradeships in Jena and Saalfeld-Rudolstadt would consist 
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of six or seven individuals – and seemed to be surprised that a 1997 report by his own 
institution suggested that the number concerning Saalfeld alone was approx. 120.88 In 
contrast to that, Thuringia’s LKA saw a serious threat from the right in the 1990s. Strikingly, 
the first President of Thuringia’s LKA, Uwe Kranz, warned publicly in 1997 that the far-right 
movement was ‘learning’ from the terrorist activities of the far-left Red Army Faction since 
the 1970s.89  
But did the practice of trivializing amount to institutional racism within the security 
institutions? Sir William Macpherson, the inquiry judge of one of the most high-profile 
investigations into institutional racism in the UK, defined the term as the ‘collective failure of 
an organization to provide an appropriate and professional service … through unwitting 
prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority 
ethnic people.’90 The joint conclusion of the Bundestag UA avoided the phrase but maintained 
that the UA members found ‘prejudices and entrenched thinking patterns’ among the 
domestic intelligence agencies which negatively affected the recognition of neonazi terrorism 
threats.91 In an individual statement, the SPD faction emphasized the findings of structural 
cognitive biases. They identified ‘routines tainted with prejudice’ which meant a schematic 
categorization of delinquency with respect to groups, milieus and ethnicities.92 More 
explicitly, the UA members of the The Linke concluded in a separate statement that the NSU 
police investigations were indeed underlined by institutional racism.93 They suggested the 
evidence demonstrated a ‘fatal combination of circumstances’ by which processes of 
ethnicizing (with respect to the victims) and cognitive bias (concerning far-right extremism) 
negatively affected the work of police forces.94 
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The Bavarian UA rejects the idea that it was ‘day-to-day, latent’ racism which prevented 
German authorities from investigating xenophobic, far-right motifs for the murders.95 
Saxony’s report only mentions the word ‘racism’ twice in the whole text – not related to state 
authorities. Thuringia’s UA finally briefly concludes that ‘racism needs to be finally taken 
seriously as an urgent problem’ and that this also needs to include racism engrained in some 
institutions.96 Like in the case of the Bundestag UA, the faction of The Linke added their own 
conclusions which explicitly maintain that structural racism exists in some state institutions.97  
Overall, it is the Bundestag UA which most forcefully engaged with the question of structural 
racism. Even their report, however, avoids a deeper discussion of the issue and comes to an 
unsatisfying conclusion in this respect. 
 
Handling of V-Personen 
One of the most contested aspects of the NSU scandal concerns the use of V-Personen by 
police and intelligence services. Authorities justify the use of confidential human intelligence 
sources (CHIS) in monitoring and infiltrating the far-right scene by emphasizing its close-knit, 
secretive nature. V-Personen work under cover. The precise number of these sources used by 
German authorities is not known. The collected evidence presented in the four inquiries 
suggests that between 1992 and 2011 most neonazi groupings and parties in Germany were 
infiltrated to some extent.  
Concerning Thuringia, the 2000 Gasser Report highlighted that, according to rules of the 
Verfassungsschutz, V-Personen ‘must not be involved in the creation of extremist 
organization, illegal cadres in companies or the creation and leadership of left- or right-wing 
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terrorist groups’.98 In direct contrast to these rules, the TLfV handled the source Dienel, code-
named Küche.99 Dienel was a senior member of the Thuringia branch of the NPD and the 
federal head of the German National Party (DNP) in 1995/96. He apparently approached the 
TLfV on 18 January 1996, and a first meeting took place five days later. Dienel was convicted 
a couple of times in the mid-1990s. The files Gasser was able to access suggest that the TLfV 
met up with Dienel 93 times and he received a total of DM 28,780. He was therefore not 
providing information on a one-off basis, but worked for the TLfV over a lengthy period of 
time as a paid V-Person.  
The Thuringia UA found further worrying interactions between the domestic intelligence 
service and the neonazi scene. For example, the THS in 1996 – the habitat in which the NSU 
trio got radicalized – was decisively led by the TLfV’s V-Person “Otto” (Tino Brandt).100 Expert 
witness Hajo Funke put emphasis on Brandt acting as a ‘double agent’ and that he might even 
have been covered up by the TLfV.101 And Brandt was by far not the only V-Person active in 
the THS. Der Spiegel suggested in September 2012 that 35 to 45 members of the THS were 
actually informers or informants from the BfV and its counterparts at the Länder level as well 
as the MAD.102 Not only is this a very high number given the limited size of the THS, but the 
background of some of the V-Personen and the position some intelligence personnel took on 
in the group were in clear contrast to existing legal regulations. At least a few V-Personen 
were involved in criminal activities; and some became very senior members which meant they 
took on a steering role the group.  
Indeed, throughout the investigations it appears that policy-makers and security authorities 
tried to reveal as little as possible about the extent of V-Personen. A striking example concerns 
the case of Thomas S. In the 1990s, Thomas S. was a well established figure in Saxony’s 
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neonazi scene and close to the NSU members. The Federal Prosecution Office investigated his 
case and, in September 2012, informed the Bundestag UA that Berlin’s LKA had been running 
S. as a V-Person from November 2000 until January 2011 (a fact never mentioned in the 
official statements or protocols of the Federal Prosecution Office). S. provided his handlers 
during five meetings between 2001 and 2005 with clues pointing towards the NSU 
members.103 Up to today it is not clear what the LKA did with the information provided by S. 
The case is particularly sensitive as S. himself admitted to the BKA in 2012 that he provided 
the NSU member Uwe Mundlos with more than one kilogram of TNT explosives, probably at 
the end of 1996 or early 1997. Those explosives were the ones found in the garage in Jena 
which the NSU used as a bomb workshop.  After the trio went undercover, S. helped them to 
find a hiding place.104 The trio subsequently avoided further contact with him, probably 
appreciating that he would be a likely target of surveillance.   
The Bundestag UA called on expert witnesses to provide testimony concerning V-Personen. 
From what the UA was able to reveal, they came to the conclusion that the Verfassungsschutz 
gained little from the relatively high number of informants in the far-right scene.105 They were 
also puzzled why the BfV did not ask their V-Personen more directly and forcefully to provide 
information about the NSU trio. More generally, the UA found several ‘problematic, partly 
inacceptable circumstances concerning the selection and handling of V-Personen’.106 
Thuringia’s UA stated that they could not come to a conclusion concerning the work of V-
Personen due to the lack of documentary evidence and questionable testimonies.107 Saxony’s 
UA flagged up the issue of V-Personen but did not provide meaningful insights. In a similar 
vein, Bavaria’s UA quickly threw in the towel and maintained that ‘the UA was not able, due 
to reasons of secrecy, to get a full picture of the practice of handling V-Personen’.108  
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In conclusion, all inquiries failed to gain crucial insights into the existence and handling of V-
Personen. It is therefore unsurprising that this issue has been taken up (again) by the NSU-
related special inquiries of the second wave. 
 
Reception 
The third pillar of our analytical framework – reception – concerns the depth and width of 
political and social impact, maintained in the form of recommendations and reforms, and 
general reaction to the committees’ work. Once the investigations into the NSU’s murder 
series had started, policy-makers, scholars, journalists and even some practitioners called for 
a number of reforms of the security sector. Moreover, the inquiry commissions pointed to 
solutions by which the identified weaknesses and shortcomings within the police and 
intelligence services as well as the judicial authorities could be overcome. This section will 
succinctly examine the main outputs and reform suggestions and discuss their impact. 
 
Outputs 
Within a period of just over a year (Bavaria) to two and a half years (Thuringia), all inquiries 
were concluded. Especially the UAs of the Bundestag and Thuringia engaged with an 
enormous amount of material. Their final reports to their respective parliament are long 
(1798 pages concerning the Bundestag) and detailed. Those of the commissions in Bavaria 
and Saxony are more compact. The federal standing intelligence committee - the PKGr, and 
its state counterparts do not release topical reports to the wider public, so a special inquiry 
has the advantage of directly communicating the findings to the wider public.109 In fact, two 
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interviewees emphasized that the final report itself was a positive contribution to greater 
transparency.110 The reports to parliament are easily accessible through parliamentary 
websites. Soon after their release, the reports were also discussed in a plenary session. 
The reports provide a rich description and significant findings of events and circumstances 
leading to the NSU scandal as well as state behavior. The findings of the Bundestag’s UA were 
extensive and addressed (though not necessarily answered) all the questions set out in the 
mandate. The Bundestag UA stated ‘complete governmental failure’ with respect to the 
BVerfS. Yet while some observers from outside the UAs found that the intelligence services 
had failed to such an extent that the only appropriate response would be to abolish them, or 
at least reduce their number, none of the commissions called for such drastic change.111  
Interviewed about their findings, members of the Bundestag UA suggested that it was 
important to them to overcome party friction and present a ‘one-voice’ report.112 This was 
understood to be a signal to the wider public suggesting that all members were appalled by 
the findings and wanted to demonstrate solidarity with the victims and their families. Hence, 
although there are some additional comments at the end of the report by some of the 
involved parties in which they emphasize some of their impressions and identify particular 
areas in need of reform, the main report includes a great number of significant joint findings 
and recommendations. This is a fundamentally different approach to the Saxony UA which 
was deeply split about the investigative exercise from the beginning. 
Just based on the Bundestag inquiry only, one interviewee suggested that there had never 
been such a ‘deep reworking’ of the work of intelligence services in Germany.113 What is 
maybe most remarkable, however, is the extraordinary opportunity for outsiders of the 
national security realm (i.e. journalists, academics and the public as a whole) to have access 
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to four reports in this first wave of NSU inquiries which, taken together, create a fascinating 
mosaïc outlining the structures and personalities which define, in particular, the German 
Verfassungsschutz network.    
In addition to the formal process of reporting and plenary debate, members of the UAs also 
explained their conclusions in media outlets.  
 
Perception 
The work and final report of the Bundestag inquiry was widely received in a positive light. 
Several interviewees agreed that all members of the inquiry committee demonstrated a high 
level of professionalism.114 That they generally achieved their aim of avoiding personal 
quarrels is reflected in the fact that all decisions were taken unanimously.  
The families and communities of the victims constituted a particular group of recipients of 
the inquiry reports. In a special session in September 2013, the UA’s findings were discussed 
in the Bundestag plenary and several family members were attending. The President of the 
Bundestag apologized to them in the name of parliament, emphasizing ‘consternation and 
shame’ about the failures of the investigations.115  
The federal government openly admitted that the NSU scandal had caused ‘insecurity and 
incomprehension’ among the public concerning the failures of security authorities.116 The 
Spiegel called the UA’s report a ‘reckoning’, appreciating the depth and scope of the UA’s 
work.117 Wider social appreciation of the committee’s work can be seen in the fact that its 
Chairman won the Genç Price for Hope and Reconciliation of the German-Turkish society in 
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June 2013. The price was given to Edathy for his commitment to the fight against right-wing 
extremism.  
Bundestag UA members promised that the final report would encourage public debate, with 
the aim of ‘adamantly fighting every form of extremism and xenophobia in our country’.118 
Inquiry member Clemens Binninger stated that the failure to stop the NSU was not only a 
failure of the security authorities, but also a failure ‘of the whole of society’. Apart from police, 
intelligence and justice authorities, politicians and the media would also have to ask why they 
never thought about right-wing extremists as potential offenders.119 The inquiries have 
certainly raised the awareness of the danger and extent of right-wing extremism in Germany. 
One interviewee described the work of the UA appropriately as an ‘awareness building’ 
exercise.120  
Two interviewees highlighted that the creation of the Bundestag UA should not be 
understood as a lack of faith in the PKGr, as the PKGr is not always able to prevent scandals.121 
Interviewee C went further to explain that a one-off inquiry might be more suitable as an 
investigatory instrument at a certain moment in time. In their view, a major advantage of a 
special inquiry is that their members are not sworn to secrecy, in contrast to the PKGr, for 
example. Hence, the public inquiry is more transparent and can easily reach out to the wider 
public. 
Taken together, the first wave of inquiries provided unprecedented insights into the extent 
of right-wing extremism in Germany on the one hand, and some crucial aspects of intelligence 
and police performance in dealing with the phenomenon. Their findings also left serious 
questions unanswered, however, and posed several new ones. As a consequence, a second 
set of inquiries – including more states as well as, again, the Bundestag – were called to 
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address those and other emerging issues. The inquiries focus on aspects such as the NSU’s 
support network; the role of informers working for the intelligence services; extremist 
violence against the police; and communication failures within the intelligence community. 
Norbert Lammert, President of the Bundestag, has urged the political class to face up to this 
challenging topic. But political rivalries in the regional parliaments, such as those in Hesse, 
and the continued secrecy surrounding intelligence work, have hindered further progress.122  
 
Implementation 
An early, major push for reforms of the security sector following the NSU-related revelations 
came from the executive Bund-Länder-Kommission which published their final report on 30 
April 2013. The focus of the body‘s investigative work concerned the various forms of 
cooperation of state security authorities with each other, as well as with their federal 
counterparts. Finding severe problems of collaboration, substantial changes for the 
Verfassungsschutz network were initiated. Reform initiatives included a duty of information 
exchange among the Verfassungsschutz offices, both at federal and state level. The 
effectiveness of collaboration was to be increased by a central database on right-wing 
extremism.123 Hosted by the BKA, the database is jointly used by the BKA, the BfV, the MAD 
and the Federal Police and, at the state level, the internal security agencies and criminal police 
units. Institutional change came with the opening of a Joint Extremism and Terrorism Defence 
Centre (Gemeinsames Extremismus- und Terrorismusabwehrzentrum, GETZ) on 15 November 
2012, an information platform which fosters information exchange of security authorities on 
these issues, not limited to far-right extremism.124 
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The recommendations by the Bundestag UA reinforced the emphasis on improved 
information and intelligence sharing with regard to crimes and events affecting more than 
one state.125 In total, the Bundestag UA listed forty-seven recommendations in their report, 
concerning intelligence, police and law enforcement. Further recommendations were made 
concerning the promotion of democracy, focusing on efforts to tackle racism, xenophobia and 
far-right extremism.126 With respect to the Verfassungsschutz network they called for ‘greater 
sensibility’ with regard to the threat which far-right extremism poses to the democratic 
state.127 This would only be possible on the basis of a ‘comprehensive change of mentality 
and a new self-conception of openness’.128 To ensure better and more effective intelligence 
work, the UA called for a strengthening of the standing parliamentary control bodies.129 
The impact of these recommendations cannot be overstated. Crucially, in the 2013 coalition 
agreement the incoming government pledged to adopt all recommendations concerning the 
federal level and to implement them speedily.130 From a symbolic point of view, this was a 
significant step by the government to emphasize their ongoing commitment to democratic 
values and their rejection of right-wing extremist thought. And a serious re-working of the 
executive has indeed been initiated.131 There is, however, no clear process by which the 
implementation of recommendations of special inquiries can be traced. While one 
interviewee suggested that there was some consideration of creating a commission which 
could monitor the implementation of reforms, such a body has not emerged. The federal 
government updated the Bundestag about the implementation of measures on an irregular 
basis, however.132 It is evident that the inquiry contributed to considerable institutional 
changes within Germany’s intelligence system as well as – less tangible – strengthening 
initiatives to increase the awareness of cognitive biases, racist and xenophobic attitudes 
within security institutions and society as a whole. 
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Central to the recommendations of Thuringia’s UA was the political demand that the state 
should finally take racism seriously as an urgent issue, and problematize it on all societal and 
political levels.133 Additional resources would be necessary to strengthen efforts to tackle 
neonazism and racism. The UA suggested the creation of an inquiry body covering racism and 
discrimination, and such a commission was eventually set up in January 2017. Its first report 
is yet to be completed. With regard to the Verfassungsschutz, the UA recommendation only 
briefly states that all members see the need for institutional changes concerning the TLfV. 
They could not agree on any, however.134  
While the Saxonian UA did not come to a joint conclusion at all, Bavaria’s UA published a fairly 
uncritical report and did not make major reform suggestions. It referred to the ongoing work 
based upon the recommendations by the Bund-Länder-Kommission Rechtsextremismus (see 
above) and the importance of better information sharing between security institutions.135 
With respect to the Bavarian Verfassungsschutz office, it proposed the re-creation of a unit 
specifically tackling far-right extremism.136 This idea was indeed implemented.137 
Overall, it is evident that Germany’s security institutions pay far-right extremism more 
attention than before the NSU scandal. A lot of groundwork had to be done in this respect, 
for example with respect to the collection of data concerning far-right perpetrators and group 
memberships. Observers bemoan the lack of a uniform procedure of monitoring right-wing 
violence in Germany.138 The BMI and civil society organizations, such as the Amadeu-Antonio-
Foundation and the Exit Initiative, remain in disagreement on figures of victims of far-right 
extremism, for example. Yet even the conservative figures produced by the BfV make it clear 
that Germany continues to have a serious problem with far-right extremism. For 2016, they 
counted 12,100 individuals from this side of the political spectrum who are willing to use 
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violence, and 1,600 atrocities.139  
 
Conclusion: a case of placebo scrutiny? 
Special inquiries into intelligence are costly, time-consuming and examine contested issues of 
national security. They should therefore, arguably, only be initiated if they promise to deliver 
a product of high quality. This article has provided three core criteria by which to assess the 
quality of such commissions’ performance: remit, rigor, and reception. The existing literature 
on intelligence accountability proposed little so far with respect to assessment criteria. In the 
post-9/11 era, however, we have seen a proliferation of this form of scrutiny, and it is 
therefore critical to systematically examine the performance of such inquiries.  
The NSU case provided fascinating material for examining the value of the RRR framework.  
Taken together, the four inquiries have provided a wealth of information about the extent of 
far-right extremism in Germany and the attitude and work of state officials tackling related 
crimes. The joint reading of the findings provides a still fragmented, but more complete 
picture. For example, while the cases of racist and xenophobic attitudes within German 
security institutions outlined in one report would have shocked a lot of people, the fact that 
other inquiries found similar details helped to provide a sense of the scale of the problem.  
Yet, not all inquiries have made a substantial contribution of knowledge. The analytical 
framework suggested that the precise admixture of remit, rigor and reception will determine 
the effectiveness of inquiry work. It has become clear that, concerning the four inquiries into 
the NSU scandal, the political will was particularly crucial. The lack of determination has 
indeed meant that Saxony’s UA performed particularly poorly in many respects. The Bavarian 
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UA also clearly stopped itself from asking too uncomfortable questions and expressing major 
criticism, despite the fact that the authorities did not even connect the dots between the five 
murders which took place within Bavaria. Both inquiry exercises can therefore be described 
as placebo scrutiny. They have, on paper, investigated the matter and raised some issues 
while, in reality, their investigations have not achieved anything. This is most concerning with 
regard to the question of racial and xenophobic attitudes within state authorities. 
In contrast, members of the inquiries of the Bundestag and the Thuringian parliament 
demonstrated remarkable stamina and pushed their investigations successfully at various 
points. Despite clear differences in detail, they both performed fairly strongly with respect to 
all three pillars of the analytical framework. Even these inquiries, however, struggled to shed 
much light on the most controversial issues, namely racism and the use of V-Personen. Their 
investigative capacity reached a clear limit in this respect and many questions remain 
unanswered. 
A crucial reason for this is the high level of secrecy embraced by state authorities. Intelligence 
executives were reluctant and, sometimes, unwilling to reveal information which would have 
shed light on crucial points. In the case of handling paid informants, a particular concern is 
the protection of sources and methods. But the problem goes deeper. From the limited 
amount of information that has become available, it is evident that several authorities acted 
in an unethical, and even illegal, fashion by working too closely with certain V-Personen and 
by allowing them to occupy strategically important roles within the far-right movement. 
Though the inquiries of the Bundestag and Thuringia could provide only some details, their 
findings were severe enough to initiate further investigation. 
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Especially the recommendations of the Bundestag were implemented swiftly. More generally, 
however, the first wave of inquiries had some immediate and significant consequences. Apart 
from institutional reforms aimed at strengthening intelligence efforts at tackling far-right 
extremism, five intelligence directors had to step down from their posts.  
While this article focused on the case of far-right extremism in Germany, the analytical 
framework and findings are not limited to its political system. Future research will have to 
examine to what extent the composition of the three RRR’s – remit, rigor and reception – 
varies, depending on the particular context. The heightened security environment and 
ongoing debates about the means and limits of intelligence work means that there will be no 
shortage of comparative work in the future.  
Regular scrutiny through parliamentary intelligence oversight committees was taking place 
across Germany throughout the period of the murders. Yet, in particular the case of Thuringia 
suggests that such committees relied to a large extent on the goodwill of the intelligence 
authorities in question. Where intelligence services were not providing the committee with 
information, the committee’s mandate to oversee the intelligence service(s) became 
meaningless. This was clearly the case in Thuringia where Roewer, then head of the TLfV, 
simply failed to inform the Landtag’s PKK to a satisfactory extent. The institution had gone 
‘topsy-turvy’ under Roewer’s leadership, according to PKK member Heiko Gentzel.140 In cases 
like this, where permanent accountability forums perform inadequately, it is most significant 
that special inquiries conduct high-quality work. If they only provide a placebo - an illusion - 
of accountability, there is a severe risk that intelligence authorities escape control under a 
blanket of democracy.   
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